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Abstract
As the most promising application in VANETs, the vehicular an-
nouncement allows vehicles to send announcement messages about road
conditions to other vehicles far away. The security requirements of relia-
bility and privacy in the vehicular announcement are not easily achieved
simultaneously due to the notorious sybil attack. In this paper, we present
a novel privacy-preserving vehicular announcements aggregation scheme.
The proposed scheme provides threshold authentication and flexible anonymity
using message aggregation and interactive threshold ring signature which
allows nondeterministic different signers to generate signature commonly
in the environment not fully trusted. Different from existing works in an
attack-then-trace mode, our scheme defends against the sybil attack be-
forehand. To our best knowledge, it is the first privacy-preserving scheme
preventing the malicious users from launching the sybil attack in advance.
Through extensive evaluation, we show the availability and the efficiency
of the proposed scheme.
1 Introduction
The technology of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) has drawn wide atten-
tions from both academia and industry in recent years. VANETs are considered
to be the most potential technology solving the problem of traffic safety and effi-
ciency [10]. In VANETs framework, vehicles are equipped with On Broad Unit
(OBU) so as to communicate with each other (V2V communication), as well
to roadside infrastructures (V2I communication) equipped with Roadside Unit
(RSU).
The vehicular announcement, one of the most promising applications in
VANETs, allows vehicles to sense the road condition and send the informa-
tion (e.g. traffic jams, car accidents, road constructions) to other vehicles so
that the receivers of the announcements can avoid the troublesome points in
advance. The announcement messages will be disseminated in a wide range, so
the information reliability is of great importance in this application. Majority-
based authentication, or threshold-based authentication, is a common method
∗Y. Jiang is with the Department of Computer and Information Technology, Beijing Jiao-
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to achieve reliability. The number of vehicles sending the same message will
help the receiver believe the truthfulness of a certain announcement message.
Message aggregation is an efficient way to implement majority-based authen-
tication, which helps to reduce the forwarding of duplicated messages and the
waiting time of the message receiver [23].
Privacy issues in VANETs are widely concerned in recent years, and it is con-
sidered to be necessary to provide privacy-preserving environment in VANETs
[10][21]. The importance of privacy in VANETs is comprehensively analyzed in
[6]. However, due to the notorious sybil attack[7], the majority-base authenti-
cation is not properly functioning in privacy-preserving environment. As ana-
lyzed in many literatures [4][13][14], naively combining anonymous techniques
and majority-based authentication cannot satisfy the security requirements in
privacy-preserving VANETs environment. It is still a challenging problem to
implement the tradeoff between reliability and privacy. For instance, consider
the following scenario:
Suppose Alice is driving on the main road, but the speed is extremely slow.
She wants to issue a message telling the other drivers that there is a traffic jam
on the main road, so the receivers can avoid the troublesome point. Only one
person issuing the message cannot convince the other people. She needs the
help of other drivers suffering from the same traffic jam to issue the message to-
gether. However, all these messages are sent anonymously in privacy-preserving
VANETs. The receivers of the messages cannot be sure that the messages are
really from different drivers on the main road, but it is not Alice’s trick to
deceive them away from the main road.
In this paper, we present a novel privacy-preserving vehicular announce-
ments aggregation scheme to solve Alice’s problem. It allows a leader who
firstly generates a message and some responders who echo the message to issue
an announcement message commonly, but the participants will be concealed in
a larger group of possible users. Our scheme provides majority-based authenti-
cation and a certain level of privacy, since the receiver of the announcement is
able to tell the number of participants while cannot tell the identities of them.
Hence our proposed scheme satisfies the seemingly contradictory requirements
in vehicular announcement scenario. Specifically, our contributions in this paper
are: 1) We propose an aggregation scheme which can prevent the sybil attack
beforehand, and it is different from the existing works in the mode of tracing
the misbehavior afterward. To our best knowledge, it is the first scheme us-
ing threshold cryptographic technology to achieve that goal. 2) We design an
interactive threshold ring signature scheme in order to meet the demands of
the aggregation scheme. Different from the traditional threshold ring signature
scheme in which a signer uses his private key together with the private keys of
the other signers to sign a common message, it can generate a threshold ring
signature without the full delegation of the private keys of the other signers or
the multiple interactions between all the signers. 3) We extend our aggregation
scheme to the NS-2 network simulator to confirm the availability and efficiency
of our proposed scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we give an
introduction of related works. In Section III, an introduction of the crypto-
graphic preliminaries we used is given. The main construction of our scheme is
introduced in Section IV. The security analysis and performance analysis of our
scheme are given in Section V. In Section VII, the simulation results of NS-2
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are provided. Then, in Section VII, we give some variants of the proposed main
scheme to achieve higher security requirements and discuss some problems of
the proposed aggregation scheme. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section
VIII.
2 Related Work
Majority-based authentication is a common method to prove message reliabil-
ity in VANETs [4][5][13][28]. Because there are no strong trusted relationships
between mobile vehicles in VANETs, in majority-based authentication schemes,
only the messages confirmed by over a threshold number of vehicles are con-
sidered to be reliable. Messages aggregation in VANETs is an effective way
to implement majority-based authentication and reduce the network overhead
meanwhile. There are a number of works designing information aggregation
protocol in VANETs. In [28], Viejo et al. proposed an aggregation and thresh-
old authentication scheme using multi-signature so that the digital signatures
in the network packets will be at a fixed length . Molina-Gil et al. proposed
a framework of aggregation for data authentication in [16]. They proposed
the concept of geographic zones and reactive groups to implement the detailed
process of aggregation in VANETs, and used a probabilistic verification algo-
rithm to improve the computation efficiency. In [9], Heijden et al. proposed the
SeDyA scheme which allows more dynamic aggregation with flexible road seg-
mentation. Concerning the privacy issues, Zhang and Qin et al. respectively im-
plemented privacy-preserving aggregation authentication protocol based on the
pseudonym technique [31][22]. In [5], Daza et al proposed a threshold-signature-
based privacy-preserving announcements authentication scheme. However, in
order to solve the problem of linkability in threshold signature, a group of users
share the same private key. Such a design increases the risk of key compromise.
In recent years, the privacy issues in VANETs have gained widespread at-
tentions. Owing to the notorious sybil attack, majority-base authentication
is not properly functioning in privacy-preserving environment. The malicious
user could pretend himself as many entities to launch the sybil attack by the
abuse the pseudonyms mechanism or anonymous-group-based authentication.
Some solutions with strong hardware-secure assumptions are used to mitigate
the sybil attack in privacy-preserving VANETs. Kounga et al. used the secure
hardware mechanism to control the generation of pseudonyms so as to prevent
the sybil attack [13]. Qin et al. used secure RSU management to implement
the pseudonyms control [22]. It has become an arduous task to design proto-
cols proving reliability of messages while concealing the origin of messages with
weak hardware-secure assumptions. Wu et al. used the linkable group signa-
ture to identify the sybil attack [29]. However, the trace operation requires two
expensive pairing operations, so it is not very efficient to trace doubtable mes-
sages. Chen et al. proposed a threshold anonymous announcement scheme with
direct anonymous attestation and one-time anonymous authentication in [4].
However, the credentials of the malicious users cannot be efficiently revoked in
TAA, so the malicious vehicles attacking frequently will affect the efficiency of
the scheme. In [14], Lin proposed a RSU-aided scheme namely LSR mitigating
the sybil attack. It supports the local sybil attack detection and can efficiently
track the attacker, but it cannot function satisfactorily in areas with sparse
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RSUs. Besides, the utilization of trusted RSUs is not helpful to bootstrap such
a system.
Different from the above works, our proposed scheme is not accordant with
the idea of sybil attack detection afterwards but to prevent the adversary before-
hand. The proposed scheme uses the aggregation way to issue announcement
messages and the threshold ring signature preliminary to provide flexible anony-
mous authentication so that it can efficiently achieve the reliability, privacy
and authentication simultaneously. Therefore, it is suitable for the privacy-
preserving vehicular announcement scenario.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Threshold Ring Signature
Threshold cryptographic technology was first introduced by Shamir in [26],
which allows a group of users to share a secret and recover the secret if over
threshold users join in the recovering process. However, due to the features
of the scheme violating unlinkability, it cannot be directly used in a privacy-
preserving scenario. Threshold ring signature was proposed by Bresson et al. in
[3]. A (t, n)−threshold ring signature can express that at least t members of a
group of n members have signed the message while it is unknown that who the
actual signers are. A threshold ring signature scheme consists of two algorithms:
• T-ring-sign: On an input message m, a ring of n members including n
public keys, and the private keys of t members, it outputs a (t, n)-ring
signature σ on the message m. The value of t as well as n public keys of
all ring members are included in σ.
• T-ring-verify: On an input messagem and a signature σ, it outputs either
1 or 0.
In traditional threshold ring signature models [3][25], the group of actual
signers in the ring is considered to be fixed and have already established a trusted
relationship, so the negotiation among the actual signers and the acquisition of
the private keys to execute the algorithm are not considered in the model. It just
uses a series of private keys in the input of the algorithm to represent a group
of determinate signers sign a message together. The traditional model does not
consider how to organize the group of signers or how to put their private keys
together, and it assumes that the signers have been determinate and they trust
each other so the private key of any group member can be used. However, in the
scenario of the vehicular announcements aggregation, the members of message
issuers are nondeterministic, and the initiator of the aggregation cannot know
who will join the process in advance. Besides, in the process of the aggregation
neither can the announcement issuers implement several interactions between
themselves, nor give the private key to the initiator. Therefore, a new protocol
with the fewest times of interaction should be designed to use threshold ring
signature in the vehicular announcement aggregation scenario. The new model
we proposed is called interactive threshold ring signature because there is a
round of communication in our model, and it consists of four algorithms:
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• T-ring-sign-request: On an input messagem, a ring size n, and the number
of actual signers t, it outputs a (t, n)-ring signature generation request δ
on the message m. The value of t and n are included in δ.
• T-ring-sign-reply: On an input message m, a signature generation request
δ on m and the private key sk, it outputs a signature fraction λ. The
corresponding public key pk is included in λ.
• T-ring-sign-generate: On an input message m, a signature generation re-
quest δ onm, t−1 signature fractions λ1, λ2, · · · , λt−1 including t−1 public
keys of the actual signers, and the private key of the signer initiating the
request, it outputs a (t, n)-ring signature σ including n public keys.
• T-ring-verify: On an input messagem and a signature σ, it outputs either
1 or 0.
3.2 Combined Public Keys
The idea of Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) was proposed in [27], 1985. In
an IBC system, a meaningful string can be used as the public key so that the
user of the public key can easily learn the owner of a public key without a PKI
certificate, because the public key itself may be the identity of its owner. The
idea of IBC helps us to reduce the burden of certificates management, but the
operations of most IBC schemes are relatively complicated. Combined Public
Keys (CPK) was originally a technology of key management proposed by Nan
[17]. In [15], Liu et al. firstly used the idea of CPK to construct an efficient
cryptographic preliminary implementing IBC. Zhang et al proposed an ECC-
based encryption scheme with the CPK preliminary in [30]. In this paper, we use
this preliminary to simplify the certificate management and reduce the length
of the ring signature.
4 Proposed Aggregation Scheme
In this section, we present our novel privacy-preserving vehicular announce-
ments aggregation scheme, which can prevent the sybil attack beforehand by
using proposed interactive threshold ring signature scheme. Our construction
of threshold ring signature is derived from the Generalized Ring Signature pro-
posed by Ren [24], but we implement threshold cryptography and signature ne-
gotiation in nondeterministic signers. Before delving into the detailed scheme,
we first introduce the basic notion of our scheme and some basic definitions.
4.1 Overview
In our scheme, we focus on the vehicular announcement application. We assume
that the announcement messages often have long dissemination range, but the
requirement of processing time is not strict. We also assume that each vehicle
is equipped with a tamper-resistant black box, which provides secure storage
for secret keys and secure cryptographic computation. The black box will be
preloaded with some public system parameters and private keys of the user.
At last, we assume that the majority of users are honest, and the adversaries
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constitute a relatively small fraction of the vehicles. These assumptions are used
in most of the VANET security protocols.
The basic notion of our scheme is coming from the idea of echo. Consider the
following scenario: Alice wants to issue some interesting stories anonymously,
and she wants everyone believes what she said is true. Therefore, Alice asks Bob
if he is willing to echo what she said. As for Bob, he believes Alice’s story, so he
tells everyone Alice’s story is true. The more people echo what Alice said, the
more believable the story is. Our announcements aggregation scheme complies
with the logic in which Alice issues stories, and we use cryptographic techniques
to implement what Alice and Bob do. There will be one car firstly issuing an
announcement message about some certain events. Then, the car asks the other
witnesses help him to generate an announcement packet. If the other vehicles
agree with what the leader car described and are willing to help him, they can
produce a fraction of the legitimate announcement. When the leader car receives
over t− 1 (a threshold value decided by the leader car) fractions, he can finally
generate an announcement packet used to warn cars far away. The identities
of participants are protected by mixing with the identities of fake signers which
are forged by the leader car. As for the verifiers of the announcement, they
only know that the announcement is issued by over t different participants,
but cannot tell who they really are. The detailed scheme will be introduced in
Section IV.D, and some simple notations will be explained in Section IV.C in
order to simplify the description.
4.2 Adversaries
There are several possible attacks in a vehicular communication system, and we
list some typical attacks here to help us analyze the security performance of our
scheme. According to the power an adversary has, we classify the attacks in
vehicular communication applications into two different types: attacks from the
outside and attacks from the inside. Typical attacks from the outside include:
• Unauthorized participation Unauthorized users directly or masquer-
ade as a legitimate user to participate in the system, and affect the man-
agement of the system.
• Message modification The content or the source of the message is al-
tered by malicious adversaries during the transmission.
• Replay attack Replay valid messages which were sent some time before.
The adversary may avoid the authentication mechanism and bother the
system, because these messages are coming from legitimate users.
• Trace attack By eavesdropping issued messages, the adversary tries to
trace an entity. It infringes on the privacy of the user to bind the sensitive
content of the messages and the identity of the user.
Attacks from the inside of the system mean that the adversary is more
powerful. The adversary can even have a legitimate private key and certificates,
but abuses the mechanism to attack the system. The upgrade attack and the
sybil attack are typical attacks from the inside.
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• Upgrade attack The upgrade attack means the adversary try to convince
the receiver of a message that the trust level of the message is higher than
it actually is. For example, in some system, roadside infrastructures and
some special vehicle (such as emergency vehicles and police car) will have
higher trusted level. Therefore, the adversary may masquerade as an
emergency vehicle to mislead other vehicles. In our system, the number
of vehicles echoing the message is the trusted level of a certain message.
• Sybil attack The adversary tries to pretend as multiple vehicles, and
may try to spread false messages to the others, and make the receivers
believe that the messages come from different sources and the content of
messages is true [7]. Because of the privacy preserving mechanisms, the
receivers cannot distinguish the sources of the messages. Therefore, the
adversary can mislead the other cars by making use of the contradiction
between authentication and privacy.
4.3 Roles and Type of Packets
There are four kinds of roles in our scheme: the trusted authority denoted
as T , the Initiator of the aggregation process denoted as I, the Replier of the
aggregation process denoted asR, and the Verifier of the announcement denoted
as V . The proposed aggregation scheme involves the following three types of
packet:
• Request Packet: When an event occurs, the Request Packet is broad-
cast by the vehicle who detects the event. There may be some vehicles
broadcasting a Request Packet, but not all of them would receive a re-
ply, the Reply Packet. We call the one who receives Reply Packets the
Initiator of the aggregation process. The Request Packet contains event
description msg, excepted threshold t, anonymous group size r, and re-
lated cryptographic content Ω. The event description msg may include
event coordinates, type of the event, traffic direction, name of the road,
time of the event, and so on.
• Reply Packet: Replay Packet is sent after the reception of a Request
Packet by any vehicle who agrees with the content of the Request Packet
and is willing to join the group to issue an announcement. We call the
vehicle sending the Reply Packet the Replier. There may be multiple
vehicles detecting the same event at the same time, so multiple Request
Packet may be received by a Replier. If that happens, the Replier sends
the Reply Packet as Algorithm 1.
• Aggregation Packet: The Initiator can produce an Aggregation Packet
after receiving over t Replay Packets. It provides higher evidence about
the existence of the reported event. Then, the Initiator broadcasts the
Aggregation Packet, and it will be forwarded by other vehicles so as to
issue an announcement.
4.4 Protocol Description
The proposed aggregation scheme consists of seven phases, namely Setup, Join,
Event found, Aggregation request, Request reply, Announcement generate,
7
Input: RequestPacketArray P, LastReply L
Sort(P, TIME); //Sort Request Packets about the same event by time
for i=0;i<P.length;i++ do
if P[i].threshold > L.threshold then
Reply(P[i]); //Send a Reply Packet
L = P[i]; //Record last replay
end
else
P[i].delete(); //Ignore packet P[i]
end
end
Algorithm 1: RequestReply
and Announ
cement verify. In Setup phase, the system parameters are created by the
trusted authority. The keys will be preset to each legitimate vehicles firstly
join the system in Join phase. The Event found phase and the Aggregation
request phase are related to the Initiator, where Event found creates event
announcement message, Aggregation request produces the Request Packet.
The Repliers generates announcement fraction and send back to the Initia-
tor in Request reply phase. Announcement generate phase generates the
Aggregation Packet, and disseminates it. The Verifiers could check whether
an announcement has been signed by a certain number different users in the
Announcement verify phase. The detailed description of our scheme is given
below.
1. Setup. Let G be an addition group consisting of points on an elliptic curve
and the order of G is q. Let P be a generator of G. Firstly, the trusted
authority T selects n secret values xi ∈ Z∗q randomly, and computes Yi =
xi · P for each xi, i = 1, · · · , n. Secondly, T selects four hash function
H0 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, n is the length of the output of a cryptographic
hash function, for example SHA-1 n = 160. H1 : G → Zq, H2, H3 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l. T chooses a symmetric encryption scheme over GF (2l)
denoted as E. We define Ek(x) as using secret key k encrypt x, and
E−1k (x) as using secret key k decrypt x. Define X = (x1, x2, · · · , xn)
as the master private key vector, and define Y = (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn) as the
master public key vector. Finally, T sets the system public parameters to
be (G, q, P, Y,H,E) and makes them public.
2. Join. The users in our system are the vehicles, and the private keys of
them are issued by a trusted authority (such as transport authority) in
Join phase. Every new vehicle will run this protocol before it joins the
system. For every user with identity ID, the private key of the user will
be computed by the trusted authority as
skID =
n∑
i=1
hixi mod q
where hi is the ith bit of H0(ID), i = 1, · · · , n. The identity of the vehicle
will be permanent, for example the the license plate number. Then, the
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private key will be transferred to the vehicle in a secure channel. Note
that each vehicle will have only one fixed private key and one permanent
identity.
3. Event found. Having detected an event, the Initiator I produces an
event description msg. Then, I chooses an appropriate value of threshold
t and size of the anonymous group r according to the current total number
of vehicles in the communication range. The anonymous group is often
called ring, which is used to hide the real group of signers in a bigger
group.
4. Aggregation request. This phase is used to produce the cryptographic
content in the Request Packet by the Initiator. It includes the following
steps:
(a) Randomly select r− t identities, and the value of r− t must be higher
than five. Define S = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDr−t}. For each IDi ∈ S,
compute PKi =
∑n
j=1 hjYj , where hj is the jth bit of H0(IDi), and
Yj is the jth value in the master public key vector Y , j = 1, · · · , n.
(b) Generate a random number γi as an index for each IDi ∈ S.
(c) Create forgeries using each PKi. Select ai, bi ∈ Z∗q arbitrarily, and
compute αi = aiP + biPKi, βi = −b−1i H1(αi), and mi = aiβi. It can
be shown that (αi, βi) is a valid EC-Elgamal signature ofmi, because
mi · P = H1(αi) · PKi + βiαi. Define Ω = ({ID1, ID2, · · · , IDr−t},
{γ1, γ2, · · · , γr−t}, {m1,m2, · · · ,mr−t},
{α1, α2, · · · , αr−t}, {β1, β2, · · · , βr−t})
(d) Wrap Ω together with the event description msg, threshold value
t, and ring size r as a Request Packet. Finally, I broadcasts the
aggregation request by sending the Request Packet.
5. Request reply. This phase is executed by the Replier R. If the user
receiving the Request Packet agrees with the event description and is
willing to join the group to issue an announcement, it will run the following
algorithm:
(a) Parse the Request Packet as (msg, t, r,Ω).
(b) Compute a symmetric key k = H2(msg), so the size of the key k is l.
(c) Construct a polynomial f over GF (2l) such that deg(f) = r −
t, f(0) = H3(t||r), f(γi) = Ek(mi), i = 1, · · · , r − t.
(d) Choose random index γ /∈ {γ1, γ2, · · · , γr−t}, and compute m =
E−1k (f(γ)).
(e) Generate a random number c ∈ Zq, and compute the EC-Elgamal
signature (α, β) of m, where α = cP, β = (m− skH1(α))c−1.
(f) Wrap γ, m, (α, β), and the identity of the replier ID as the Reply
Packet. Finally, R sends the Reply Packet to the Initiator I.
6. Announcement generate. After sending a Request Packet, the Initia-
tor I waits for the Reply Packets coming from the neighbors. Once I
receives over t Reply Packets, it can generate a joint announcement. As-
sume the identities of the Repliers are S = {IDr−t+1, IDr−t+2,
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· · · , IDr}. I combines the signatures in the Reply Packets with the
forgeries in the Request Packet to produce a threshold ring signature,
which is A = (msg, t;S ∪ S;< γ1,m1, α1, β1 >,< γ2,m2, α2, β2 >, · · · , <
γr,mr, αr, βr >). The Announcement Packet contains the signature will
be broadcasted and forwarded to prove the existence of an event, and the
real signers who participate in the process of signature generation are hid-
den in a bigger group to preserve their privacy. Finally, the Aggregation
Packet will be broadcasted and disseminated in a wide range.
7. Announcement verify. When a user receives an announcement, he can
run the following algorithm to verify the truthfulness and reliability.
(a) Parse the Announcement Packet as (msg, t;< ID1, γ1,m1, α1, β1 >
,< ID2, γ2,m2, α2,
β2 >, · · · , < IDr, γr,mr, αr, βr >).
(b) Compute a symmetric key k = H2(msg).
(c) For each IDi, i = 1, · · · , r, compute PKi =
∑n
j=1 hjYj , where hj is
the jth bit of H0(IDi), and Yj is the jth value in the master public
key vector Y , j = 1, · · · , n. Verify the equation miP = H1(αi) ·
PKi + βiαi. If any one of the tuples < mi, αi, βi > does not satisfy
the equation, the verifier rejects the signature.
(d) Recover the polynomial. Randomly select r−t pairs of< γi, Ek(mi) >
in the received packet, and pair < 0, H3(t||r) > to reconstruct the
polynomial f such that deg(f) = r − t, f(0) = H3(t||r), f(γi) =
Ek(mi)
(e) Check if the rest of the pairs < γj , Ek(mj) > in the Announcement
Packet satisfy f(γj) = Ek(mj). If any one of the pairs does not
satisfy the equation, the verifier rejects the signature. Otherwise,
the verifier accepts the signature.
The signature convinces that there are more than t participants who wants
to report the event while it is not sure that who the participants really is.
If the signature in the Announcement Packet is verified, the receiver can
believe the truthfulness of the reported event.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Security analysis
In this section, we informally analyze that how our proposed scheme can satisfy
the requirements of unforgeability, reliability and privacy, and defend against
typical attacks in the vehicular announcement scenario.
• Unforgeability: The unforgeabilty of the proposed ring signature is
based on two difficult problems. The first one is the one-way function
of creating forgeries introduced in proposal [24]. If the adversary forge a
signature without breaking the verification polynomial, he is able to forge
valid Elgamal signatures of any specified messages, which is considered
to have negligible probability. The formal proof is referring to [24]. The
second one is the difficulty of solving a equation with high degree. It is
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generally known that there is no general method to solve the equation
when the degree of the equation is higher than five. Therefore, it is in-
feasible to forge Elgamal signature pairs without a private key satisfying
the specified verification polynomial. The formal proof is referring to [3].
Based on the two facts, The possibility of forging a signature is negligible.
• Reliability: The announcement messages are protected by digital sig-
natures. The utilization of symmetric encryption ensures the verification
polynomial used in one signature cannot be corresponded to signature of
a different message. If the adversary wants to modify the content of an
announcement, he has to forge a signature, and it is infeasible because
of the unforeability of the signature. If the adversary wants to issue fake
event report with high trust level in a legitimate way, these aggregation
requests will not result in any replies, since we assume that the number of
malicious vehicles is relatively small. Hence our proposed scheme satisfies
the requirement of reliability.
• Privacy: We firstly consider the privacy of the multi-hop disseminated
announcement packets. The Announcement Packets is the only packet
which will be broadcasted and received by many vehicles in the network.
The privacy of participants producing the Announcement Packets is pro-
tected by the threshold ring signature. The threshold ring signature pro-
vides indistinguishability among all ring members, but only part of them
are the actual signers of the signature. It means the group of partici-
pants of the aggregation will be concealed in a larger group of possible
signers. Therefore, our scheme provides a certain level of privacy. The
other packets will be disseminated in one-hop communication range, but
these packets leaks the privacy of the participants. The privacy preserva-
tion is embodied in three aspects. Firstly, the Request Packets and Reply
Packets will be broadcasted in one-hop communication range. It means
that only the participants of the event can receive the packets. Secondly,
the content in Reply Packets are meaningless random strings. Hence, the
identity of user will not be linked with the detailed event message. Finally,
the Repliers can deny having sent the Reply Packet, because it can be a
forgery made by the Initiator, so it cannot be proved that a certain one
key is used in our scheme. Therefore, it is still preserving the privacy of
the participants to some degree.
• Prevention of sybil attack: Our scheme applies threshold crypto-
graphic technique based on the Lagrange Interpolation. Therefore, the
signature cannot be generated unless over the threshold different private
keys are used. Note that every vehicle has only one bound identity and
corresponding private key in our scheme, so it is easily proved that there
are more than t vehicles involves in the aggregation. Meanwhile, the uti-
lization of ring guarantees that no one is able to tell who the signers are
although every user has a fixed signing key by hiding the actual signers
among a group of indistinguishable fake signers. Different from the idea
of existing works, the idea of threshold cryptography defends against the
sybil attack beforehand, and the adversary will never launch the sybil at-
tack without the help of the number exceeding the threshold of legitimate
users.
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Table 1: Comparison of functionalities
Data Anonymity Threshold Decentra- Without Message Sybil
Integrity lization RSU Issue Attack
TAA
√ √ √ × √ normal tracing
LSR
√ √ × × × normal fast tracing
Our Scheme
√ √ √ √ √
aggregation preventing
• Prevention of upgrade attack: The upgrade attack means the adver-
sary try to convince the receiver of a message that the trust level of the
message is higher than it actually is. Specifically, in our scheme, the attack
may modify the threshold value in a legitimate Announcement Packet. In
our protocol, the construction of verification polynomial is related to the
threshold value which the Initiator first set. Tampering the trust level
of the announcement will result in verification failure, and the receiver of
the announcement will drop the message. Hence the designed protocol
can defend against the upgrade attack.
• Prevention of reply attack: The adversary replays the received le-
gitimate message before in order to mislead the other vehicles about the
existence of a certain event. In our scheme, the event description msg
generated in the Event found phase is required to contain the time de-
scription of the event. The replay attack can be easily prevented by check-
ing the current time and the event time unless the adversary tampers the
content of the message and forges a valid signature.
Then, we compare the security functionalities of our scheme with two rele-
vant schemes, which are TAA [4] and LSR [14] in Table I. Data integrity and
anonymity are satisfied in all proposals. Threshold verification is not considered
in LSR. As group signature is used in TAA and LSR, the central group manager
must be introduced and trusted. In our scheme, we use the idea of threshold
ring signature, so provide flexible anonymous group assembly and threshold
verification. Besides, our scheme uses message aggregation way to issue an an-
nouncement message and improve efficiency, while TAA and LSR are normal
vehicular communication scheme. Finally, both TAA and LSR could implement
trace the sybil attack afterward, and LSR depends on the help of RSU to im-
plement fast misbehaviour tracing. However, our scheme can prevent the sybil
attack beforehand by using threshold cryptographic techniques.
5.2 Performance analysis
In this section, we mainly analyse the performance of cryptographic operations
of our scheme, and the simulation will be introduced in the next section. The
proposed scheme is implemented with cryptographic library PolarSSL [20] and
math library GMP [8]. The test data were collected from a HP Compaq 8200
Elite SFF PC, which is equipped with Intel Core i5-2400 quad-core CPU, clocked
at 3.10 GHz, 4 GB RAM. We use the curves NIST recommended, and they are
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(a) Ring size r = 20 (b) Ring size r = 30
(c) Ring size r = 40 (d) Ring size r = 50
Figure 1: Average cryptographic computation time in different phases of the
scheme
widely used in real systems [2]. Figure 1 gives the average computation time of
three phases related to cryptographic operations in our scheme.
In general, the most expensive operations can be computed in a few hun-
dred milliseconds, which can satisfy the application demands in the vehicular
announcement scenario. The computation time of Aggregation request and
Request reply decrease with the increment of threshold value when the ring
size is fixed, and the computation time of Announcement verify is regardless
of the threshold value, and is related to the size of the ring. The reason is
that the most expensive computation in our scheme is related to the number
of the forged signers. When the ring size is fixed, the more actual signers par-
ticipant (the threshold indicates the number of the actual signers) the less fake
signers will be forged. As for the Announcement verify phase, all the signers
must be treated equally because the Verifier cannot tell who the actual signers
are. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the threshold value in the view of the
computation overhead. The computation time of Request reply is very small
comparing to the other two phases, so the Repliers can response the Initiator
in time and efficiently finish the process of aggregation.
On the other hand, the choice of ring size and threshold is also related to
the anonymity level of the ring members. There are two ways to express the
anonymity in our scheme. The first one is the probability that an adversary
judges if a ring member is an actual signer of the signature correctly. Obviously
the success rate is the ratio of the threshold t to the ring size r. The other
method uses the probability in which an adversary can find at least the number
of actual signers of a signature. For example, consider a signature with ring size 3
and threshold 2, and the adversary guesses two members whom he considers are
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Figure 2: The relationship between the number of the actual signers founded
successfully by the adversary and the probability in different threshold t and
ring size r
the actual signers of the signature. The probability that he guesses correctly at
least one actual signer is 100%, and the probability of at least two is 1/3. Figure
2 shows the relationship between the number of the actual signers founded
successfully by the adversary and the probability in different threshold t and
ring size r. Both of the ways show us that higher threshold setting leads to lower
anonymity, although it takes less time in cryptographic computation. Repliers
may not be willing to sacrifice their privacy with a lower anonymity request,
so the Initiator should balance the anonymity, the computation cost and the
trusted level by choosing appropriate parameters in the aggregation request.
We then compare our scheme with the TAA scheme. The implementation
of TAA is based on the PBC library [19]. Table II gives the comparison of
cryptographic computation time at the same security level. We assume that
there are 10 vehicles who want to report a same traffic jam on a certain road.
In TAA, the announcements are generated independently by each vehicle, and
the generation time is about 24.5ms. As for the Verifiers, they have to verify the
signature of every message one by one, and it takes about 74.3ms to verify one
announcement. In our example, the Verifier receives 10 announcements, so the
total verification time is about 743ms. Therefore, the total cost is 767.4ms. In
our scheme, the generation of an announcement is divided into two phases. The
Initiator spends 46.4ms to issue a certain Request Packet in phase one, and every
Replier spends 1.6ms to send a Reply Packet back to the Initiator in phase two.
Because of the aggregation request and parallel replies, the generation cost of an
announcement is about 48ms. The verifiers can directly verify the aggregated
announcement in 126.1ms, and be sure that the message coming from at least 10
different vehicles. In our example, the advantage of announcement verification
of our scheme is shown. In practice, 10 vehicles will not issue messages at the
same time, so waiting enough witnesses will take more time than our analysis
in TAA. However, in our scheme, the Replier who wants to echo the message
will be leaded by the Initiator, so there will be less waiting time. Note that in
our example the ring size is set to 20. If the Initiator wants higher anonymity,
the total cost time will be more.
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Table 2: Comparison of computation time(ms)
Generation Verification Total
TAA 24.5 74.3× 10 767.4
OUR
Initiator: 46.4
126.1 174.1
Replier: 1.6
Figure 3: Simulation scenario
6 Simulation
In this section, we present the simulation of the proposed aggregation scheme.
The simulation scenario we used was built by the tool presented in [12]. Figure
3 shows the simulation scenario, and the others detailed parameter settings are
given in Table III.
In order to observe the degree of availability of our system, we use the NS-
2 simulator to evaluate our scheme [18]. The first indicator is the validation
probability, which means the success rate in which a certain message can be
endorsed by over t different cars and an aggregation announcement is produced
successfully. By varying the total number of vehicles in the simulation and the
ring size r the Initiator set, we can observe the trends of validation probability
and the aggregation delay in different vehicle densities and ring sizes.
Figure 4 gives the validation probability in different vehicle densities. Vehi-
cle density is expressed in vehicle/km2. Because the ring size setting has very
little effects on the validation probability (less than 1% according to our simula-
tion), we just use the condition of ring size 20 as an example shown in Figure 4.
Obviously, the validation is easier for smaller threshold value or higher vehicle
density. As shown in Figure 4, the proposed scheme cannot work very well with
high threshold values in very sparse networks. It is suggested to take a lower
threshold value to guarantee the availability. The proposed scheme performs
good in medium-density or high-density, which makes it suitable for vehicular
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Table 3: Simulation settings
Parameter Setting
Simulation duration 200s
Simulation area 2400m ×2400m
Number of vehicles 50/150/250
Average velocity of vehicles 60km/h
Vehicle Communication range 300m
MAC-layer protocol 802.11p
Figure 4: Average validation probability of message aggregation
announcement scenario. In areas with very low traffic (sparse networks), vehic-
ular announcements are not often used, because there is hardly anybody who
benefits from them.
There may be connectivity issues and high performance penalty during the
process because there will be a round of communication between the initiator
and every single responder before generating the announcement packet. There-
fore, we use the interval between the time of a Request Packet sent out and the
corresponding Announcement Packet produced as the second evaluation indi-
cator so that we can learn if useful announcements can be generated in time
and how the cost will be. Since the verification process mainly depends on
cryptographic operations of the Verifier and with little effect of the network
condition, we do not discuss the Announcement verify phase in this part. Fig-
ure 5 gives the simulation results of ring size 20. We only use Figure 5 as an
explanation here, because the results in the other ring size settings are similar
to the results of ring size 20. The line of vehicle density 8.68 rises up to 120ms
when the threshold value increases to six, because it denotes the time-out of
the aggregation process. In fact, we can learn that vehicles cannot produce
the Announcement Packet with low density 8.68 and high threshold value over
six from Figure 4. Comparing the results in Figure 5 with the test results of
cryptographic operations shown in Figure 1, we can learn that the aggregation
delay is close to the computation time of cryptographic operations. Although
the transmission delay and the vehicle density also affect the total consuming
16
Figure 5: Average time of producing an Announcement Packet
of producing an Announcement Packet, the magnitude of these network factors
is smaller than cryptographic computations. The reason is that the process of
response is very simple and fast, and the influence of the dynamics of VANETs
and transmission delay is very small on the phase. In summary, the biggest im-
pact factor of the total aggregation consuming is the cryptographic computation
delay.
We then further study the relationship between non-cryptographic delay
and the arguments of our scheme. Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict the non-
cryptographic delay, which mainly includes transmission delay, and the delay
of waiting replies. The vehicle density mainly influences the delay of waiting
replies. Figure 6 shows that the non-cryptographic delay is smaller when the
vehicle density is higher. The reason is that the vehicle is more likely to find
companions in higher density scenarios, so the aggregation is likely to be done
in a shorter time. The ring size mainly influences the transmission delay in
communications, because the network packet size is related to the ring size set-
ting. Figure 7 shows that the non-cryptographic delay will increase according
to the increment of the ring size of the announcement. The threshold value
also contributes to the non-cryptographic delay. We can learn that the delay
increase linearly with the increment of threshold value from both Figure 6 and
Figure 7. The reason is that the waiting time of every Repliers can be seemed
as obeying the uniform distribution, so the total waiting time emerges the linear
relationship to the number of participants.
7 Variant and Discussion
In this section, we introduce two variants of the proposed scheme to achieve
higher security goals and discuss some possible problems of our scheme.
As discussed in [11], the utilization of CPK may involve a kind of collusion
attack. The basic idea of the collusion attack is that some adversaries who
have legitimate private keys commonly compute the secret master private key
vector. If enough ID linearly independent adversaries use their private key
values to carry out the collusion attack, they will get part of or maybe all of the
content of the master private key vector. Then, they can calculate the private
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Figure 6: Non-cryptographic delay in different vehicle densities
Figure 7: Non-cryptographic delay in different ring size settings
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keys of other innocent users. In our basic scheme, we did not consider this
kind of attack, because the utilization of vehicular black box can protect the
private key from being disclosed. It means even the adversary has a legitimate
private key, he cannot abuse it or get its value. However, in order to avoid the
hardware-based assumption, we give a variant of our main scheme to achieve
higher security level in this section.
In Setup phase, the trusted authority T computes the private key of user
with identity ID as skID =
∑n
i=1 hixi + µ mod q, where µ is chosen uniformly
from Z∗q . Both the private key skID and random value µP are assigned to the
user. In Aggregation request phase, the Initiator I computes each public keys
of fake ring signers as PKi =
∑n
j=1 hjYj+νP , where ν is a random element in Z
∗
q
chosen by I. The forgeries created by I are changed to (αi, βi, D = νP ). Also,
the signature computed by the Replier R in Request reply phase is changed
to (αi, βi, D = µP ). In Announcement verify phase, the Verifier V check the
equation miP = H1(αi) · (PKi +D) + βiαi for each ID in the ring signature.
In our proposed variant, the introduction of random value in private key as-
signment can mitigate the collusion attack by increasing the unknown numbers.
However, the length of the final announcement is increased to approximately
4/3 times of the original version. Although the simulation results show that the
size of the network packets will not significantly affect the efficiency, another
simple method of increasing the size of the key vectors also helps to mitigate
the collusion attack to some degree. We present the variant to the discussion
part, because the significance of the variant version may be depending on the
application environment.
Another problem is the privacy in one-hop communication range. In our
basic scheme, the Repliers will leak its identities to its neighbors in one-hop
communication range. The privacy preservation between event witnesses is
not considered, but the negotiation result (the announcement) is anonymous.
We consider it is acceptable for normal-power adversaries and not very strict
anonymity level. In fact, some applications (e.g safety applications) in VANETs
themselves require information about one-hop neighbors [1]. As for the normal-
power adversaries, they cannot acquire identity-related information unless the
adversary is one of the litigants. More powerful adversaries may be capable of
eavesdropping whole networks. We present another variant with normal public
key encryption mechanism to prevent eavesdropping adversaries here.
In Aggregation request phase, the Initiator I generates a short-term key
pair denoted as pk, sk. They can be key pairs in any kind of public key system,
but we recommend ECC-based encryption for short length of ciphertext. The
Initiator puts the public key pk into the Request Packet, and broadcasts the
packet. In Request reply phase, the Repliers R constructs the polynomial
using f(0) = H3(t||r||pk) and encrypts their Reply Packets with the public key
pk in the Request Packet. Finally, only the Initiator I owning private key sk
can decrypt the Reply Packets and produce the Announcement Packet.
The eavesdropping adversaries cannot read the Reply Packet because of en-
cryption, so they will not learn the identity of the participants by monitoring
the negotiation process. If the adversary changes the public key value pk in
Aggregation request phase, it will be equivalent to re-initiate a new aggre-
gation request of the adversary. The reason is that the broadcasted Request
Packet cannot be deleted by the adversary, and the Reply Packets are bound
to the specified aggregation request. Nevertheless, the variant version of our
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scheme is still inadequate to guarantee the privacy in one-hop communication
range when the Initiator itself is a malicious adversary. In usual cases, the Ini-
tiator issuing accurate messages is trustworthy by other vehicles. Besides, the
adversary will just affect a small part of the network in this situation. Therefore,
we just discuss it in this section. We think it is a difficult problem to establish
trusted relationships efficiently among totally intrusted nodes in the unstable
aggregation scenario. It is beyond the scope of this paper, and we will leave
it as a problem for further researches. Possible solutions to account the mali-
cious Initiator may be rejecting to reply the aggregation when the information
is really sensitive to the Replier or only trusted vehicles can be elected to be an
Initiator.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a novel privacy-preserving vehicular announce-
ments aggregation scheme in VANETs. The proposed scheme is based on the
interactive threshold ring signature which can commonly generate a threshold
ring signature between nondeterministic actual signers without the full delega-
tion of the private keys of the other signers. Our scheme is capable of preventing
sybil attack beforehand, but not providing the detection afterwards like exist-
ing schemes. Through extensive evaluation, we have demonstrated that the
proposed scheme can implement the high trustworthiness and the privacy of the
vehicular announcement simultaneously, and can efficiently work in the vehicu-
lar announcement scenario.
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